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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEDERAL
GIFT TAX
JAmES T. Guy*

T

HE United States Supreme Court is being called upon to pass
definitely on the constitutionality of the Federal Gift Tax. This
(Revenue Act of 1924, Section 319-324, 43 Stat. L. 253, 313-316) became effective June 2, 1924, and was repealed by the Revenue Act of
1926. It provides in part:
Sec. 319. For the calendar year 1924 and each- calendar year thereafter, a tax equal to the sum of the following is hereby imposed upon
the transfer by a resident by gift during such calendar year of any
property wherever situated, whether made directly or indirectly ....
Considerable revenue was collected for the two years that the Act
was in effect.
Since this Act was passed there has been considerable discussion
among lawyers and text writers as to its constitutionality. The taxatiofn of gifts causa mortis is not unusual, but never before has there
been any attempt t6 impose a tax upon gifts inter mivos.
Several suits have been started to test the constitutionality of the
act with the result that so far the federal judges who have considered
the question have been unable to agree. Two District Court judges
have held the act unconstitutional; one has held it constitutional. One
Circuit Court of Appeals has held it constitutional and another has
certified the question to the United States Supreme Court without
decision.
The first decision was by Judge A. N. Hand of the District Court of
the Southern District of New York-Geo. McNeir v. Charles W.
Anderson." This court held the tax unconstitutional on the ground
that it was a direct tax. The Court said:
There is, I believe, no case where such a tax as the one now under
consideration has been regarded as a tax upon an excise or privilege.
Moreover, so far as I can discover, it is a form of taxation new in
both America and Europe. Testamentary gifts and gifts in contemplation of*death have been, both in England and in the United States,
treated as excises, and subjected to taxation upon that theory. If
there is afiything left of the general views of the court in Pollack v.
Farmers' Loan and Trust Company, 158 U.S. 6oi, as to the nature
of so-called direct taxes, the tax upon a gift not made in contemplation
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of death and not to take effect upon death would seem to be necessarily a direct tax imposed upon the donor purely as the owner of
property.
The tax under consideration seems to have no more warrant than that
before the Supreme Court in the recent case of Dawson v. Kentucky
Distilleries, 255 U.S. 288. There the tax was described as a license
tax of persons engaged in the business of owning and storing whiskey
in bonded warehouses. The Supreme Court, however, held that the
tax was really one on the right to take possession and remove whiskey
from a bonded warehouse and was a direct tax upon property and
not upon an occupation or license. Mr. Justice Brandeis said in the
opinion:
"To levy a tax by reason of ownership of property is to tax the
property .....
.It cannot be made an occupation or license tax by
calling it so."
About the same time Judge Raymond of the United States District
Court of the Western District of Michigan reached the opposite conclusion in the case of John W. Blodgett v. Charles Holden.2 The
court was of the opinion that the tax was on the transmission or transfer itself and not on the property, nor on the right to transfer, and that
hence it was an excise tax as distinguished from a direct tax and therefore did not need to be apportioned. This court further held that the
retroactive feature of the law, i.e., its application to all gifts made during the calendar year of 1924, although the law did not become effective
until June 2, 1924, was not an abuse of congressional powers nor the
taking of property without due process of law and therefore not in
violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
That case also involved the question as to whether state and municipal securities could be taxed. The court held that the act of the federal
government in taxing such securities was not an unlawful interference
with governmental functions and did not violate the Tenth Amendment
to the Constitution.
The McNeir case was appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the second circuit and was reversed. Volume 3, Commerce Clearing
House, Federal Tax Service 1927, paragraph 7073.

The court held

that the tax is not a direct tax but an excise tax on one of the uses of
property and the fact that it is retroactive does not make it unconstitutional. The court says that power to lay and collect taxes, duties,
imposts and excises is exhaustive and embraces every conceivable power
of taxation; that there is not to be found in the cases, a clear definition
of, precisely what is meant by either a direct tax or an excise tax. It
has become a rule of application to each particular tax, and is not to be
answered by the theories of political economists. It further holds that
2ii Fed. (2nd) i8o.
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the tax is not imposed because of general ownership of the property,
but because of the happening of an event. The transfer of the pr6perty by gift gives rise to its levy. The excise imposed is like the act
of using property or selling property, and the single use of propertythe gift of it-which is a use the owner may make, may furnish the
occasion for laying a valid excise.
The court's comments on the retroactive feature of the tax are very
brief. It states that Congress has the power to enact retroactive tax
legislation and in view of the clear language of the statute and its
positive direction there can be no doubt that a gift made any time after
January I, 1924, is taxable under the statute. This, of course, presupposes that the tax is an excise rather than a direct tax.
The Blodgett case was also appealed. The Circuit Court of Appeals
for the sixth circuit, without attempting to decide the questions involved, certified the questions to the United States Supreme Court.
Judge Geiger, in the District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, decided two cases in the latter part of December: LeFeber v.
Wilkinson and'Nunnenacherv. Wilkinson. Both these cases involved
the constitutionality of the gift tax. In both cases the gifts were made
before the passage of the Act. While all the constitutional questions
were argued the judge passed on only the retroactive feature of the
Act. The court says in part:
Now, when that is so, the question is particularly asked. Here
are the gifts made in February and May, 1924, prior to the passage
of this act. It seems absurd to say that the Nunnemacher and LeFeber
donors should be told on June 2, 1924, that they are now subjected
to an excise upon an act wholly beyond their power to revoke, recall,
or do a thing in respect to what they had previously done; and how
then can you escape the idea, although it is called an excise, that it is
nothing more or less than a direct tax, either against their property or
against them, in respect of a completed transaction, which, if I might
put it that way, at the time Congress passed the law was no longer,
as to them, excisable?
The plaintiffs took judgment in each of these cases and the government appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the seventh circuit
where the cases are now pending.
Some of the arguments raised in the briefs on the part of the various
taxpayers are these:
(a) The act being, retroactive is unconstitutional in that it deprives
the taxpayer of his property without due process of law in violation.
of the Fifth Amendment.
(b) The tax is a direct tax, a tax on property, and since it is not
apportioned it violates Article i, Section 9, subdivision 4, of the United
States Constitution.
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(a) The Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides that
no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law. In the case of Levy v. Wardell,3 the United States
Supreme Court in construing the 1916 Estates Tax Act held that if the
Act were construed as being retroactive it was unconstitutional in view
of the Fifth Amendment.
That Act provides that the gross estate
should include for taxation purposes all gifts made "at any time" in
contemplation of or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment
at death. As to gifts made before the passage of this Act the court
(p. 544) said that if the act was construed as retroactive it:
Was in violation of the Constitution of the United States in that it
would take the property of plaintiffs without due process of law in
violation of the Fifth Amendment .....
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
in Coolidge v. Nichols,4 held Section 402c. of the Revenue Act of 1919
-the retroactive section as to gifts causa inortis-unconstitutional and
void insofar as it attempts to impose a tax on transactions entirely
completed before the passage of the Act.
The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in Frick v. Lewellyn,5 held section 402f. of the Revenue Act
of 1918 violative of the Fifth Amendment in that the state attempted
to collect taxes on the avails of life insurance policies which were vested
in a third person and did not pass through the estate.
On the other hand, there are cases holding that the retroactive feature of the 1918 Federal Estates Tax is constitutional. However, apparently the conveyances covered by those cases were not final and
complete and did not vest in full possession and enjoyment until the
death which occurred after the passage of the Act.
If the retroactive features of the Estates Tax Law is violative of the
Fifth Amendment it would seem that the same reasoning would apply
to the Gift Tax.
(b) Article I, Section 9, subdivision 4, of the United States Constitution provides that no capitulation or other direct tax shall be allowed unless in proportion to the census or enumeration heretofore
directed to be taken.
The principal reliance of the taxpayers is upon the case of Pollock
v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co.,6 which holds that taxes on the income
from realty or personalty and taxes upon personal property are direct
3

258 U.S. 542.
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taxes; and also upon Dawson v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 7 which holds
that a tax on persons at so much per gallon for withdrawing whiskey
from a bonded warehouse for consumption or sale, is a direct tax upon
the property itself.
Also Levy v. Wardell,8 where the court directly held that the 1916
Estates Tax Act was a direct tax insofar as it applied to gifts made
before its passage. The court states (p. 544-5) that if the law should
be construed as retroactive it
would not be . . . . a transfer tax or indirect tax, but would be a
direct tax thereon in violation of Article I, Section 9, subdivision 4,
of the Constitution of the United States because not laid, in proper
relation to census or enumeration as. therein provided.
This is the most direct and positive holding that a gift tax is a direct
tax.
It is also contended that the case of Schlesinger v. Wisconsing directly supports the contention that the gift tax is a property tax. The
court holds that the Wisconsin law, Section 72.Ol, is unconstitutional,
that is, that part of the law which creates a conclusive presumption that
gifts made within six years of death are made in contemplation of
0
death. This part of the Act is a gift tax. In the Estate of Ebeling,"
the Wisconsin court says that it is immaterial whether this is considered
a tax on gifts inter viros or on gifts causa mortis. In other words, as
the law relates to gifts not actually made in contemplation of death it
is. a gift tax as distinguished from inheritance tax. It is this law, that
is the law taxing gifts inter vivos, that the United States Supreme
Court holds unconstitutional in the Schlesinger case for two reasons:
First, it .creates an arbitrary classification in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment in that it taxes gifts made within six years before death
while it does not tax other gifts, and "secondly, they are subjected to
graduated taxes which could not properly be laid on all gifts, or indeed,
upon any gift without testamentary character." The Fourteenth
Amendment does not affect the Federal Gift Tax but the Schlesinger
case is important in that it holds that a gift tax not being testamentary
in character is unconstitutional if it is graduated. This shows that the
Supreme Court considers the Wisconsin Tax-in effect a gift tax-as
a property tax rather than an excise tax. This must be so because it
has always been held that an excise tax may be of graduated character.
Magoun v. Illinois Trust and, Savings Bank'
If the court had con255 U.S. 288.
'258 U.S. 542.

46 Sup. Ct. 260.
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sidered the Wisconsin tax an excise tax it would not have held it unconstitutional on the second ground named i.e., because of its graduated
character.
It will be seen from this brief r6sum6 of the cases that there is a
good deal of confusion among the courts as to the constitutionality of
the tax in question, and the decision of the United States Supreme
Court is therefore awaited with a great deal of interest by all lawyers
interested in taxation and constitutional questions.

